What is going on in Afghanistan? How long ago it appeared to be a major success, both militarily and politically. BICC has a long report on the security situation in Afghanistan, from the army to the police, from justice to the treatment of women. The report cites many reasons for security failures in Afghanistan:

• The central government does not control most of the country.


• Warlords maintain militias through profits from corruption (especially failing to turn over customs to the central government), foreign states, and narcotics production.


• The army is not integrated, and is regarded by most Afghanis as another faction force.


• The defense ministry has been slow in implementing reforms.


• Taliban forces, reinforced with former Al-Qaeda, have been making advances in Pashtun areas of the country.


• Pashtun’s feel that they are left out of political decisions; in their disillusionment, they turn to insurgent activities.


• UN and other humanitarian organizations cannot operate in most of the country.

In spite of these reasons, all of which are very good, the report points to “donor fatigue” as a major problem as well. The western countries (US and NATO states) are no longer as willing to commit troops and money to maintain the peace and allow for progress. This one problem has had some effect on all the others, either denying the Afghan government essential resources in order to provide security or withdrawing support.

According to the report, the coalition forces (hereafter ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)) had not added adequate numbers of peacekeepers in the country. The small army in formation in Kabul has not the reach nor the resources to exert itself over the entire country and integrate (or disarm) the militias. The spaces that are beyond the control of Kabul are open to terrorists. Consequentially the small army is insufficient to undermine the sources of revenues of the warlords (the report writers say that this should be the primary objective of security policy: cutting warlords off from foreign and illegal sources of capital.) The limited presence of the ISAF around Kabul has limited the geographic implementation of democratization in Afghanistan.

The decrease in contributions is also alarming. This report was written before Bush’s request for $87 billion. At this time international funding for programs in Afghanistan was low. Funds that were allocated supported the presence of troops rather than reconstruction. Essential programs to retrain soldiers and police officers were languishing. (Interestingly, the report blames the lack of a central organizing force to see that these goals are implemented; it recommends that the UN take over reconstruction and security buildup.) Available native security forces are underfunded and easily corruptible. There are no institutions to promote justice, and gender-based violence is appearing anew.

Has the world lost interest in Afghanistan? It is very likely. Karzai is no longer the lauded hero of the American media; no one talks about American interest in Afghani culture.