Just as I was about to return from Cologne, the big recurring story concerned what the US would do about Liberia—would troops be sent to support the efforts of the West African states (collectively the Economic Community of West African States, hereafter ECOWAS.) Liberia and its president Charles Taylor had been a thorn in the side of the West Africans, both Anglophone and Francophone, for years. His support of rebels had threatened security in neighboring countries. The counter-insurgency activities of the individual states (mainly supporting Liberian rebel groups like LURD and MODEL—retaliation rather than remedy) threatened a general breakdown of security. As rebels advanced on the capital city of Monrovia, Nigerian president Obasanje (for whom I have conflicting feelings—a leader of the Kampala movement, he has a mixed record in domestic affairs) offered Taylor asylum and committed troops to peacekeeping roles under the guise of ECOWAS. The Nigerian troop commitment would be significant—more than such a small country could normally handle.

A US force would be necessary to support this effort: it would be in command of the eventual UN force that would absorb the ECOWAS effort and that would create a peacekeeping force of up to 15,000 troops. In its immediate role, the US forces would takeover from ECOWAS forces after they had secured the coastal cities and backed them up in more contentious disarmament roles in the interior counties. Here is where the US could best employ the threat of force: backing up the West African troops would allow them to confront rebel groups with greater confidence. (See International Crisis Group August 6, 2003) Nonetheless, the Bush administration planned for more limited roles for the US forces: maintaining an entry point for aid at Monrovia. They would play no greater role in the country, and they would play no role in disarmament—neither directly or as a backup. (See Washington Post, August 9)

What progress has there been? Other than an agreement between the rebel groups and the post-Taylor government (see the Accra Agreement) the security situation in Liberia has been awful. The US deployed 200 marines into Liberia on August 15, and they were withdrawn ten days later. A force of 3,500 marines remains offshore, giving the Liberians the opinion that the Bush administration has no commitment to either Liberia or West Africa. This is a major blow to US prestige. Any support troops in Liberia currently are only present to deal with the security of the US diplomatic mission: they are present to help with any future withdrawal of the mission, nothing more. Under these conditions, ECOWAS cannot move from the coastal cities. (See Washington Post, September 24, 2003)

The rebels have found that they can ignore the agreement without danger of reprisals. LURD shelled Monrovia in the area surrounding the US Embassy with shells that they gained from Guinea, which they received from the US. MODEL has also gained heavier artillery from guerillas returning from Ivory Coast. (International Herald Tribune, September 17)

Attacks have increased in the interior. The US ended helicopter patrols in late September. (Oxfam, October 3, 2003) The necessary 15,000 UN troops cannot reach Liberia until April 2004. Attacks on civilians and soft targets abound in the rural counties. (Oxfam, October 27, 2003) With the exception of Monrovia, the rest of Liberia has returned to same conditions that it faced before Charles Taylor stepped down. This is a major failure for Bush policy—he had failed West Africa with his week commitment. Were a few thousand troops in a support role too much to ask for? This is embarrassing. Bush needs to send those troops ashore so that ECOWAS can work on the situation. There needs to be a program of disarmament (remember how George sr. failed to disarm the Somalian militias until they were entrenched?).