The rhetoric used by the right, that of appeasement versus action, is deceptive and ambiguous. Johno already points out that the choices are not that simple--that the suggested dichotomy is itself false. I would go further. The false dichotomy suggests that patience is not a virtue, that good solutions are blusterous and berserk, and that all action is good action. These are wrong.

Part of the root of the problem is the praise heaped on Churchill as an anti-appeaser. Leaving aside that Chamberlain has been somewhat maligned (he pushed through several controversial plans in 1938, just before and after Munich, that put a priority on fighter production that increased British capacity and allowed for air defense during the Battle of Britain), Churchill was a strategic idiot. Did he attack Germany? No. He delayed and avoided direct conflict at every opportunity. His wars were peripheral wars: Scandinavia, Greece, Italy. They were poorly prepared, they did little to weaken Germany, and they cost the Allies manpower and time. The first two were humiliating defeats, and the latter was an unnecessarily hard slog. Being a man of action (versus appeasement) did not make Churchill a better military leader. He showed passion and confidence that couched his lack of imagination and unwillingness to confront Germany directly. FDR dragged the kicking and screaming Churchill to Normandy. In the process, Britain lost its military independence.

War in Iraq is peripheral war. It is action, but it is inappropriate action. It hopes that it might get our enemies in al-Qaeda in its sights by being in Iraq. But the question must be asked: what member of al-Qaeda has been killed or captured in Iraq who was part of the planning and execution of Sept. 11 (or at least someone who belonged to the organization by Sept. 11)? As far as I know, we have captured but a few documents that show an exchange of cordialities between Iraq and individual al-Qaeda members. But if we look at how the war in Iraq was supposed to help against al-Qaeda, we must conclude that Bush is not confronting al-Qaeda directly.

1. If Bush hopes that the occupation of Iraq could be used to draw in terrorists, we are fighting a peripheral war.


2. If Bush hopes to make an example of democracy in Iraq that will encourage Arab/Middle East governments to quell homegrown terrorism, we are fighting a peripheral war.


3. If Bush wants to use Iraq as a base from which to have a staging ground for later operations, we are fighting a peripheral war.

WE ARE FIGHTING A PERIPHERAL WAR. By claiming to be a man of action has not made George Bush effective at combating al-Qaeda. Like Churchill, his actions have been public, overt, and roundabout. His action is in his imprecise use of language, not in deeds. Such is that case when he was "tired of swatting at flies." What was his solution: according to Rice, "hunting down terrorists one-by-one." As the Carpetbagger Report points out, "Isn't "hunting down terrorists one-by-one," the same thing as "swatting flies"?"

Action is not always good action. It is still more important for the government to recruit and train people to act covertly in the circles of al-Qaeda. It is still more important for the government to have good relations in coordinating with the international community. It is still more important to recruit, train, and fund firefighters, port security officers and airport security officers. It is still more important for the government to pressure totalitarian regimes to observe human rights.

Because of the peripheral war in Iraq, America has new burdens that divert resources from directly confronting al-Qaeda. We have, in essence, gained a semi-industrial society as a protectorate. The financial burden is enormous. The manpower burden is enormous. The damage to our reputation may be irreversible.

The peripheral war in Iraq has not moved us from "do nothing" to "take action". It has allowed us to do less.